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Abstract
Consider a society with a finite number of sectors (social issues or commodities). In a partial equilibrium 
(PE) mechanism a sector authority (SA) aims to elicit agents’ preference rankings for outcomes at hand, 
presuming separability of preferences, while such presumption is false in general and such isolated rankings 
might be artifacts. This paper studies what can be Nash implemented if we take such misspecification of 
PE analysis as a given institutional constraint. The objective is to uncover the kinds of complementarity 
across sectors that this institutional constraint is able to accommodate. Thus, in our implementation model 
there are several SAs, agents are constrained to submit their rankings to each SA separately and, moreover, 
SAs cannot communicate with each other. When a social choice rule (SCR) can be Nash implemented by 
a product set of PE mechanisms, we say that it can be Nash implemented in PE. We identify necessary 
conditions for SCRs to be Nash implemented in PE and show that they are also sufficient under a domain 
condition which identifies the kinds of admissible complementarities. Thus, the Nash implementation in PE 
of SCRs is examined in auction and matching environments.
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1. Introduction
The methodology used in the literature of mechanism design in order to understand how to 
solve a single allocation decision problem whose solution depends on private information held 
by various agents is that of PE analysis. This methodology isolates outcomes to be allocated as 
well as people’s preferences for those outcomes from the rest of the world, under a ceteris paribus 
(all else equal) assumption. Because of such isolation, PE mechanism design has provided exact 
mechanisms and algorithms on how to elicit the private information from agents so as to achieve 
desirable allocation decisions, and has proved capable of handling a wide variety of issues, not 
only economic but also political and legal. The prominently successful cases are auction and 
matching.
Of course, this isolation is legitimate if agents have separable preferences over a product set 
of outcomes X = X1 × · · · × X. This is because when an agent has a separable preference, 
a well-defined marginal preference exists on each component set Xs of the product set, which is 
independent of the values of other components.
The ceteris paribus assumption, however, cannot be true in general, since people’s preferences 
are generally non-separable. This means that a marginal preference over a component set depends 
on the values chosen for the other components. For example, which school one would like to be 
admitted to may depend on where she lives and, moreover, which catchment area she would 
like to live may depend on which school she could be admitted to. When the school authority 
requires participants to report their school rankings, it believes that its participants have separable 
preferences, while such rankings may be artifacts.
Not least, when we change something in the school admission program, it will have a general 
equilibrium effect, such as changes in the housing market and how people choose where to live, 
etc. Likewise, when we change something in an auction rule, it will have a general equilibrium 
effect on how people consume goods related to the auctioned item and, moreover, will affect 
bidders’ willingness to pay for the item auctioned off, and so on.
Perhaps, a centralized allocation mechanism may be better equipped to deal with issues arising 
from non-separability of agents’ preferences. However, this mechanism is not available or feasi-
ble in real life. Given that the goal of implementation theory is to study the relationship between 
outcomes in a society and the mechanisms under which those outcomes arise, it is important to 
throw light on how such isolations dictated by the practice of PE mechanisms affect outcomes in 
society. In this paper, we ask the following questions: What do we lose by ignoring such general 
equilibrium effects? More specifically, if we take the practice dictated by PE mechanisms as a 
given institutional constraint, can one describe the requirements on SCRs that are equivalent to 
Nash implementability by a product set of PE mechanisms? What kind of complementarity, if 
any, is this practice able to accommodate?
This paper answers the above questions by assuming that there are  ≥ 2 social issues, or 
sectors, and n ≥ 3 agents in society. It assumes that every agent in society is involved in all 
social issues.
Moreover, it supposes that there is a Central Authority (CA) who wishes to Nash implement 
a SCR, which depends on private information held by various agents. Since the CA cannot de-
sign any centralized mechanism and, thus, cannot elicit any private information from agents, he 
delegates the decision-making authority to independent SAs, such as the school authority, the 
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their interaction is controlled by independent SAs.
Given these delegation arrangements, a SA dealing with the social issue s designs an allo-
cation mechanism or PE mechanism, s , for the issue at hand. This mechanism asks agents to 
report only the information pertaining to the issue s as well as assigns outcomes of Xs on the 
basis of the information elicited from agents. Given a product set of PE mechanisms, one for 
each issue, denoted by  = 1 × · · · × , each agent communicates with each SA separately. 
Since each SA specifies the PE mechanism in advance, the agents themselves know exactly not 
only which game induced by s is being played for the issue s, but also which overall game 
induced by  is being played.
This paper uses Nash equilibrium as the equilibrium concept for solving the game that s
leads to in every environment and for solving the game that  leads to. This is because diffi-
culties arise when agents’ preference are non-separable. For instance, a classic PE mechanism 
is the so-called Top-Trading-Cycle (TTC) algorithm (Shapley and Scarf, 1974). Many methods 
for finding desirable allocations in matching environments are variants of this algorithm. The 
reason for its success is that the TTC algorithm is strategy-proof; that is, true-telling about her 
own marginal preferences for houses (or some other indivisible items such as tasks or jobs) is 
a dominant strategy for each agent. However, when preferences are not separable, a dominant 
strategy no longer exists. Indeed, there is not even a “true” marginal preference for houses. With 
non-separable preferences it thus becomes necessary to consider a weaker notion of equilibrium.
In the standard literature of Nash implementation, a SCR is Nash implementable if the au-
thority can design a mechanism whose set of Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides with the 
outcomes prescribed by the welfare criterion incorporated into the SCR. In our set up, the CA 
has the same objective as in the standard set up, only now he has to achieve it via a product set 
of PE mechanisms . Moreover, SAs have the same objective as in the standard set up, only now 
their Nash implementation problems pertain only to their respective issues. Finally, the objectives 
of SAs are linked to the CA’s objective.
As in Maskin’s (1999) original result, we show that a SCR that can be Nash implemented in 
PE satisfies a remarkably strong invariance condition, now widely referred to as Maskin mono-
tonicity. Furthermore, we also show that it satisfies a decomposability condition, a sector-wise 
Maskin monotonicity condition and a decomposable Maskin monotonicity condition.
Decomposability requires that the SCR can be decomposed into one-dimensional SCRs, one 
for each sector, and that the range of the SCR is the product of the ranges of the one-dimensional 
SCRs if the domain of the SCR consists only of separable preferences. Sector-wise Maskin 
monotonicity requires that each one-dimensional SCR needs to satisfy the standard invariance 
condition due to Maskin (1999). Decomposable Maskin monotonicity states that an outcome (
x1, · · · , xs−1, xs, xs+1 · · · , x) ∈ X should continue to be selected by a given SCR at one pro-
file of separable preferences R′ if 
(
x1, · · · , xs−1, xs, xs+1 · · · , x) has been one of the outcomes 
selected by the SCR at one preference profile R and the state has moved from R to R′ in a 
such way that for no agent and for no sector s it is true that 
(
x1, · · · , xs−1, xs, xs+1 · · · , x) has 
fallen with respect to any alternative of the type 
(
x1, · · · , xs−1, ys, xs+1 · · · , x) in her personal 
ranking.
1 In line with implementation literature, we use the term SA as an idiom for a social planner who selects the mechanism 
to implement a SCR and who only cares about the welfare of society.
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we characterize Nash implementability in PE with recourse to two conditions reminiscent of 
the so-called no veto-power condition. It follows from this result that for Nash implementation 
problems in PE in which there is a private good, Nash implementability in PE of a SCR is 
nearly equivalent to sector-wise Maskin monotonicity, decomposability, decomposable Maskin 
monotonicity and Maskin monotonicity.
Our exercise does not deliver anything new when agents have separable preferences, because 
the implementation problem can simply be decomposed into several implementation problems, 
one for each sector, and each SA solves its problem separately. The interesting case is thus when 
preferences are not separable. What can we do in this case given the institutional constraint 
represented by the practice of PE mechanisms? Under the domain restriction P1, SAs do not 
need to care about non-separabilities, and the CA cannot do anything about it. School board 
simply asks households to submit rankings over schools, whether there is indeed such thing or 
not. Housing agency simply asks households to submit rankings only over houses, whether there 
is indeed such thing or not. Auction agency simply asks bidders to submit their willingness to 
pay for an item, whether there is indeed such thing or not, and so on.2
To illustrate our answer further, in a perhaps cynical manner, consider that there are two 
sectors, say L and R, where sector L allocates left shoes and sector R allocates right shoes. 
When an agent reports to the SA for L that she wants some left shoe, we can naturally understand 
that this is so because she intends and expects to get the right shoe counterpart from SA for R. 
However, the SA for L here understands only that she likes that left shoe as an individual item, 
and does not question why she wants it. This is stupid, but this is exactly the nature of PE 
mechanism design.
The domain restriction P1 roughly states that one can never gain by getting worse outcome 
in each sector. This restricts the kinds of complementarities that are admissible in PE design. 
One might suspect that this domain condition is simply a tailor-made one such that the product 
of sector-wise mechanisms works. However, we show that the condition is indispensable for 
any PE mechanism to work, not just for the particular mechanism we have constructed (see 
Example 1). Therefore, in order to accommodate complementarities that lay outside our domain 
condition there is a need to move away from the practice of PE analysis and to start analyzing 
implementation problems where an incomplete, but yet not negligible, communication is allowed 
among SAs and where the CA has to make some modelling choice about how SAs communicate.
Section 4 assesses the implications of our characterization result in matching and auction 
settings. It shows that some non-dictatorial SCRs defined on preference domains that allow non-
separability of preferences are Nash implementable in PE. For instance, in a multi-item auction 
setting with private values in which buyers have non-separable preferences for items being sold 
due to income effects, one can attain the goal of efficiency as a Nash equilibrium outcome in PE 
by means of the sector-wise Vickrey (second-price; 1961) auction solution. Roughly speaking, 
2 We should note that in our discussion we say each individual reports only marginal rankings to each SA just for 
illustration purpose. Actually, for each of the mechanism we construct, individuals’ strategies also include an allocation 
component and tie-breaking device component. Given that our mechanisms are admittedly abstract and there is no rea-
son to restrict attention to them, one may wonder whether one can obtain more permissive results if each individual is 
allowed to report information about the entire economy. Unfortunately, the result cannot change because of the institu-
tional constraint of the PE analysis. Indeed, what an individual may report to one SA about the entire economy can be 
different from what she reports to another SA. Moreover, the SAs do not communicate each other for cross-checking the 
information collected and there is no additional informational value in doing so.
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and prescribes that this winner pays the amount of the second-highest bid.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the theoretical frame-
work and outlines the basic model, while necessary and sufficient conditions are presented in 
section 3. Section 4 assesses the implications of our characterization result. Section 5 concludes 
by suggesting directions for future research. Appendix includes proofs not in the main body.
2. Preliminaries
We consider a finite set of agents indexed by i ∈ I = {1, · · ·, n} and a finite set of elementary 
sectors indexed by s ∈ S = {1, · · ·, }. The set of outcomes of sector s available to agents is 
represented by Xs , with xs as a typical element. Xs is called sector-s outcome space. We assume 
that the set of outcomes available to agents is the product space
X =
∏
s∈S
Xs .
To economize on notation, for any sector s, write sC for the complement of s in S. Thus, 
(xs, xsC ) is an outcome of X, where it is understood that xsC is an element of the product space 
XsC =
∏
s¯∈sC
Xs¯ .
In the usual fashion, agent i’s preferences over X are given by a complete and transitive binary 
relation, subsequently an ordering, Ri on X. The corresponding strict and indifference relations 
are denoted by P (Ri) and I (Ri), respectively. The statement xRiy means that agent i judges x
to be at least as good as y. The statement xP (Ri) y means that agent i judges x better than y. 
Finally, the statement xI (Ri) y means that agent i judges x and y as equally good.
The condition of separability of preferences that must hold if the isolation of sector-s decision 
problem from others is legitimate can be formulated as follows. For each xsC , we define the 
sector-s marginal ordering, Rsi (xsC ), on Xs by
for all ys, zs ∈ Xs : ysRsi
(
xsC
)
zs ⇐⇒ (ys, xsC )Ri (zs, xsC ) .
We say that the ordering Ri is separable if for all s ∈ S,
Rsi
(
xsC
)= Rsi (ysC ) for all xsC , ysC ∈ XsC .
In other words, Ri is separable if the agent i’s preferences over outcomes of Xs are independent 
of outcomes chosen from XsC . Again, to save writing, for any separable ordering Ri , write Rsi
for the sector-s marginal ordering induced by Ri .
We assume that the CA does not know agent i’s true preferences. Thus, write R (X) for the 
set of orderings on X, Rsep (X) for the set of separable orderings on X, and Ri for the domain of 
(allowable) orderings on X for agent i. We assume that the CA knows the domain of preferences 
for the set I , which is the product set of agents’ domains, that is,
RI =
∏
i∈I
Ri ,
with R as a typical profile. Also, we assume that there is complete information among the agents 
in I .
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The goal of the CA is to implement a SCR ϕ : RI  X where ϕ (R) is nonempty for any 
R ∈RI . We shall refer to x ∈ ϕ (R) as a ϕ-optimal outcome at R. The common interpretation is 
that a SCR represents the social objectives that the society or its representatives want to achieve.
The CA delegates the achievement of the goal(s) to SAs, each of which believes that agents 
have separable preferences and, subsequently, designs a PE mechanism. Because we endorse the 
methodology of PE analysis, each SA is assumed to be able to conceive only marginal prefer-
ences which are consistent with allowable separable preferences. Formally, for each s ∈ S, we 
denote sector-s domain for agent i by Dsi , which is defined by{
Rsi |Rsi is induced by Ri ∈Ri
⋂Rsep (X)}=Dsi .
To see why this is needed, consider a multi-item auction setting with private values in which 
buyers have preferences for items being sold and where each item is auctioned separately. In 
this setting, any allowable preference cares for the sum of income transfers across sectors, and 
cash transfers are not to be evaluated differently: money is money. Because of this, any allowable 
separable preference has to be represented in the form of a sum of quasi-linear functions under 
the methodology of PE analysis. Then, given that marginal orderings induced by non-separable 
preferences are not necessarily quasi-linear, the SA will notice that there is something wrong with 
the methodology when he perceives that participants may have non-quasi-linear preferences for 
outcomes of his sector. In order that PE mechanism design works “successfully,” such type of 
situations have to be avoided.
Write DsI for the product set of Dsi ’s, with Rs as a typical profile. The goal of sector-s SA is to 
implement a one-dimensional SCR ϕs :DsI Xs where ϕs (Rs) is nonempty for any Rs ∈DsI . 
Again, we shall refer to xs ∈ ϕs (Rs) as a ϕs -optimal sector-s outcome at Rs .
The delegated sector-s SA knows the domain of sector-s preferences DsI and the delegated 
objective ϕs . However, we assume that this authority is unable to associate any element of Dsi
with a specific element of agent i’s domain Ri . To make the analysis consistent with the method-
ology of PE analysis we further assume throughout the paper that (i) the only concern of a SA 
is to promote the goal(s) of the CA and (ii) there is no communication between SAs about the 
information elicited from the agents.
Each SA delegates the choice to agents according to a PE mechanism, which aims to elicit 
the private information related to sector s from agents. Thus, in pursuing his target(s), sector-s
SA designs a PE mechanism s = ((Msi )i∈I , hs), where Msi is the strategy space of agent i in 
sector s and hs : Ms → Xs , the outcome function, assigns to every strategy profile
ms ∈ Ms =
∏
i∈I
Msi
a unique outcome in Xs .
A PE mechanism s together with the profile Rs ∈ DsI defines a strategic game (s,Rs) in 
sector s, in which each agent chooses her strategy and all agents’ strategy choices are made si-
multaneously (that is, when choosing a strategy choice each agent is not informed of the strategy 
choice chosen by any other agent). A strategy profile ms ∈ Ms is a Nash equilibrium (in pure 
strategies) of (s,Rs) if for all i ∈ I , it holds that
for all m¯s ∈ Ms : hs (ms)Rshs (m¯s,ms ) .i i i i −i
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for the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes of (s,Rs).
In delegating the achievement of the goal(s) to SAs, the CA ‘loses control’ of the mechanism 
design exercise. In other words, he does not design any mechanism. Moreover, from his point 
of view, each agent is free to choose strategically from her strategy space Mi =
∏
s∈S
Msi so as 
to influence the outcomes of PE mechanisms in her favour. Naturally, which outcomes can be 
obtained by agent i depends on profiles of outcomes that this agent can achieve in each sector s, 
while keeping her opponents’ actions fixed at some strategy profile m−i ∈
∏
j∈I\{i}
(∏
s∈S
Msj
)
. 
Therefore, from the point of view of the CA, the mechanism governing communication with 
agents is a product set of PE mechanisms  = ((Mi)i∈N ,h), where Mi is the strategy space of 
agent i and h : M → X, the outcome function, assigns to every strategy profile
m ∈ M =
∏
i∈I
Mi
a unique outcome in X such that
h(m) = (hs (ms))
s∈S .
A product set of PE mechanisms  ≡ (s)s∈S and a profile R ∈ RI induce a strategic 
game (,R). A strategy profile m ∈ M is a Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies) of (,R) if 
for all i ∈ I , it holds that
for all m¯i ∈ Mi : h(m)Rih (m¯i,m−i ) ,
where, as usual, m−i is the strategy profile of all agents except i such that (mi,m−i ) = m. Write 
NE(, R) for the set of Nash equilibrium profiles of (,R), and write h (NE(,R)) for the set 
of Nash equilibrium outcomes of (,R).
2.2. Nash implementation in PE
Suppose that the CA wants to Nash implement the SCR ϕ. In the standard literature, the CA 
provides agents with a mechanism which has the following feature. For every admissible profile 
of orderings, the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes of the mechanism for that profile is identical 
to the set of outcomes dictated by the SCR for it. In our set up, the CA has the same objective 
as in the standard set up, only now he has to achieve it via a product set of PE mechanisms; 
that is, via a mechanism where the decision-making authority is delegated to SAs (see part (i) of 
Definition 1 below). Moreover, SAs have the same objective as in the standard set up, only now 
their Nash implementation problems pertain only to their respective sectors (see part (ii) of Def-
inition 1 below). Finally, if the delegation from the CA to SAs is to be effective SAs’ objectives 
must be linked to the CA’s objective. Thus, and in contrast to the standard definition of Nash im-
plementation, our definition of Nash implementation in PE embodies the existence of a structure 
which links the goals of SAs to the CA’s goal (see part (iii) of Definition 1 below). A sector-s SA 
cannot do its part unless it receives information telling it what outcomes are to be achieved as 
Nash equilibrium outcomes for the domain Ds . Moreover, if x is a Nash equilibrium outcome at I
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equilibrium outcome, the SA would be able to detect problems with the domain DsI .3
Definition 1. The SCR ϕ : RI X is Nash implementable in PE if there exist a product set of 
PE mechanisms  and a sequence (ϕs)s∈S of one-dimensional SCRs, where ϕs : DsI  Xs for 
all s ∈ S, such that:
(i) for all R ∈RI : ϕ (R) = h (NE(,R)),
(ii) for all s ∈ S : ϕs (Rs) = hs (NE (s,Rs)) for all Rs ∈DsI ,
(iii) for all R ∈RI : m ∈ NE(, R) for some m ∈ M =⇒ ms ∈ NE
(
s, R¯s
)
for some R¯s ∈DsI , 
for all s ∈ S.
Let  be a product set of PE mechanisms. If a profile R consists of separable orderings, then 
the Nash equilibrium outcomes of the game (s,Rs) do not depend on outcomes that agents can 
obtain from games played in other sectors. Indeed, for cases like this, the Cartesian product of 
Nash equilibrium outcomes of the games ((s,Rs))s∈S constitutes the set of Nash equilibrium 
outcomes of the game (,R); that is, NE (,R) = ∏
s∈S
NE (s,Rs).4 Indeed, if the domain RI
of the SCR ϕ is represented by the domain of profiles of separable preferences, Nash implemen-
tation in PE consists only of part (ii) of the above definition.
3. Necessary and sufficient conditions
3.1. Necessary conditions
The relevance of implementation theory comes from the fact that it provides a theoretical 
construct within which to study the way in which a society shall trade off agent preferences to 
achieve its goals. Unless the SCR is dictatorial, this involves a compromise. The first condition 
identifies a property of how a SCR must handle the compromise across sectors where agents’ 
preferences are separable.5
Definition 2. The SCR ϕ : RI  X is decomposable provided that for each s ∈ S, there exists 
a (nonempty) correspondence ϕs : DsI  Xs . Moreover, ϕ (R) =
∏
s∈S ϕs(Rs) for each profile 
R ∈RI ⋂RsepI (X).
This says that if a SCR is decomposable, then the sth dimension of the SCR depends only on 
the profiles of marginal orderings of the sth sector. Differently put, the SCR can be decomposed 
into the product of one-dimensional SCRs. Furthermore, it implies that the social objectives that 
a society or its representatives wants to achieve can be decomposed in ‘small’ social objectives, 
one for each sector. Therefore, to analyze the way in which the society should trade off agent 
preferences for the sth sector to achieve its goal, we can ignore consumption trade-offs across 
sectors and focus only on the profiles of marginal orderings of sth sector.
3 We are grateful to a referee and an associate editor for having pointed out the need of making explicit the link between 
objectives.
4 The proof is available upon request from the authors.
5 As usual, Rsep (X) =Rsep (X)× .... ×Rsep (X) (n times).I
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Proof. Let the premises hold. Then, by Definition 1, there exists a product set of PE mechanisms 
 and a sequence (ϕs)s∈S of one-dimensional SCRs, where ϕs :DsI Xs for all s ∈ S, such that 
parts (i)–(ii) are satisfied. Furthermore, take any profile R ∈RI ⋂RsepI (X). Note that∏
s∈S
NE
(
s,Rs
)= NE (,R) .
Suppose that x ∈ ϕ (R) = h (NE (,R)). By definition of the domain Dsi , it follows that the 
sector-s marginal ordering Rsi induced by the separable ordering Ri is an element of Dsi . Since 
x ∈ h (NE (,R)) =∏s∈S hs (NE (s,Rs)), part (ii) implies that xs ∈ ϕs (Rs) for all s ∈ S, as 
sought.
Conversely, suppose that xs ∈ ϕs (Rs) for all s ∈ S. Part (ii) implies that xs ∈ hs (NE (s,Rs))
for all s ∈ S. Since ∏s∈S hs (NE (s,Rs)) = h (NE (,R)), part (i) implies that x ∈ ϕ (R). We 
conclude that ϕ is decomposable. 
In the literature of strategy-proof social choice functions, it has been shown that decompos-
ability is implied by strategy-proofness where agents have separable preferences (as per Barberà 
et al., 1991; Le Breton and Sen, 1999). A natural question, then, is whether decomposability is 
implied by Nash implementation.6 The answer is no.7
A condition that is central to the Nash implementation of SCRs is Maskin monotonicity. This 
condition says that if an outcome x is ϕ-optimal at the profile R and this x does not strictly 
fall in preference for anyone when the profile is changed to R′, then x must remain a ϕ-optimal 
outcome at R′. Let us formalize that condition as follows. For any ordering Ri and outcome x, 
the weak lower contour set of Ri at x is defined by L (x,Ri) = {x′ ∈ X|xRix′}. Therefore:
Definition 3. The SCR ϕ : RI  X is Maskin monotonic provided that for all x ∈ X and all 
R, R′ ∈RI , if x ∈ ϕ (R) and L(x, Ri) ⊆ L(x, R′i ) for all i ∈ I , then x ∈ ϕ
(
R′
)
.
Theorem 2. The SCR ϕ :RI X is monotonic if ϕ is Nash implementable in PE.
Proof. The proof follows directly from Maskin (1999). 
Furthermore, as one would expect, we require Maskin monotonicity for each sector; that is:
Definition 4. The decomposable SCR ϕ : RI  X is sector-wise Maskin monotonic provided 
that for all s ∈ S, all xs ∈ Xs and all Rs, R¯s ∈DsI if xs ∈ ϕs (Rs) and L(xs, Rsi ) ⊆ L(xs, R¯si ) for 
all i ∈ I , then xs ∈ ϕs (R¯s).
Theorem 3. The decomposable SCR ϕ :RI → X is sector-wise Maskin monotonic if ϕ is Nash 
implementable in PE.
Proof. The proof can be found in Maskin (1999). 
6 A SCR ϕ : RI  X is Nash implementable if there exists a mechanism γ ≡ (M,h) such that for all R ∈ RI , 
ϕ (R) = h (NE (γ,R)).
7 An example is available upon request from the authors.
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ϕ-optimal at R but not ϕ-optimal at R′, then the outcome x must have fallen strictly in someone’s 
ordering at the profile R′ in order to break the Nash equilibrium via some deviation. Therefore, 
there must exist some preference reversal if an equilibrium strategy profile at R is to be broken 
at R′. When the new profile R′ satisfies the requirement of separability and the SCR ϕ is Nash 
implementable in PE, then the sth dimension of the SCR depends only on the profiles of marginal 
orderings of the sth sector. Therefore, a variant of Maskin monotonicity follows the reasoning 
that if x is ϕ-optimal at R but not ϕ-optimal at R′ and if R′ is a profile of separable orderings, 
then the outcome x must have fallen strictly in someone’s marginal ordering. Simply put, if an 
equilibrium strategy profile at R is to be broken at R′, then the preference reversal must happen 
in one of the sectors. To introduce this variant of Maskin monotonicity, for any ordering Ri , 
outcome x and sector s, let the weak lower contour set of Ri and sector s at x be defined by 
Ls (x,Ri) = {(ys, xsC ) ∈ X|xRi (ys, xsC )} where xsC =
(
x1, · · · , xs−1, xs+1, · · · , x). Then:
Definition 5. The SCR ϕ : RI  X is decomposable Maskin monotonic provided that for all 
x ∈ X, all R ∈ RI and all R′ ∈ RI ⋂RsepI (X), if x ∈ ϕ (R) and Ls(x, Ri) ⊆ Ls(x, R′i ) for all 
i ∈ I , for all s ∈ S, then x ∈ ϕ (R′).
Theorem 4. The SCR ϕ : RI  X is decomposable Maskin monotonic if ϕ is Nash imple-
mentable in PE.
Proof. Suppose the SCR ϕ : RI  X is Nash implementable in PE. Then, there exists a prod-
uct set of PE mechanisms  such that for all R ∈ RI , it holds ϕ (R) = h (NE(,R)). For 
some profile R ∈ RI consider x ∈ ϕ (R). Then, there exists a Nash equilibrium strategy pro-
file m ∈ NE (,R) such that h (m) = (hs (ms))s∈S = x. Moreover, for all i ∈ I , it holds that the 
set of obtainable outcomes, that is, h (Mi,m−i ) =
{
h
(
m′i ,m−i
) ∈ X|m′i ∈ Mi}, is contained in 
L (x,Ri). Consider any sector s and any agent i. Let(
hs
(
Msi ,m
s−i
)
,
(
hs¯
(
ms¯
))
s¯∈sC
)
=
{(
hs
(
m¯si ,m
s−i
)
,
(
hs¯
(
ms¯
))
s¯∈sC
)
|m¯si ∈ Msi
}
be the set of outcomes that agent i can generate by varying his own strategy for sector s, keeping 
his own strategy choices and those of other agents for sector s¯ = s fixed at ms¯ and keeping 
the strategy choices of other agents for sector s fixed at ms−i . It follows from h (Mi,m−i ) ⊆
L (h (m) ,Ri) that 
(
hs
(
Msi ,m
s
−i
)
,
(
hs¯
(
ms¯
))
s¯∈sC
)
⊆ Ls (h (m) ,Ri). Since agent i and sector s
were arbitrary, it follows that
for all i ∈ I and all s ∈ S :
(
hs
(
Msi ,m
s−i
)
,
(
hs¯
(
ms¯
))
s¯∈sC
)
⊆ Ls (h (m) ,Ri) . (1)
Consider a profile R¯ ∈RI ⋂RsepI (X) such that
for all i ∈ I and all s ∈ S : Ls (h (m) ,Ri) ⊆ Ls
(
h(m) , R¯i
)
.
Then, from (1), it follows that
for all i ∈ I and all s ∈ S :
(
hs
(
Msi ,m
s−i
)
,
(
hs¯
(
ms¯
))
s¯∈sC
)
⊆ Ls (h(m) , R¯i) . (2)
Given that R¯ ∈RI ⋂RsepI (X), let R¯si be the sector-s marginal ordering induced by R¯i . Thus, 
from (2), we have that
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where L(hs (ms) , R¯si ) is the weak lower contour set of R¯
s
i at h
s (ms). Then, for all s ∈ S, ms ∈
NE
(
s, R¯s
)
, and so, part (ii) of Definition 1 implies that xs ∈ ϕs (R¯s) for all s ∈ S. Since ϕ is 
decomposable and R¯ ∈RI ⋂RsepI (X), it follows that ϕ (R¯)=∏s∈S ϕs(R¯s), and so x ∈ ϕ (R¯). 
Thus, ϕ is decomposable Maskin monotonic. 
3.2. A characterization theorem
In implementation theory, it is Maskin’s Theorem (Maskin, 1999) that shows that when the 
CA faces at least three agents, a SCR is implementable in (pure-strategies) Nash equilibrium if 
it is Maskin monotonic and it satisfies the auxiliary condition of no veto-power.8
In the abstract Arrovian domain, the condition of no veto-power says that if an outcome is 
at the top of the preferences of all agents but possibly one, then it should be chosen irrespective 
of the preferences of the remaining agent: that agent cannot veto it. The condition of no veto-
power implies two conditions. First, it implies the condition of unanimity, which states that if an 
outcome is at the top of the preferences of all agents, then that outcome should be selected by 
the SCR. Thus, as a part of sufficiency, we require a variant of unanimity, which states that if all 
agents agree on which outcome is best for sector s, then this outcome should be chosen by the 
sth dimension of a decomposable SCR.
Definition 6. A decomposable SCR ϕ : RI  X satisfies sector-wise unanimity provided that 
for all s ∈ S, all xs ∈ Xs and all Rs ∈DsI if Xs ⊆ L 
(
xs,Rsi
)
for all i ∈ I , then xs ∈ ϕs (Rs).
Second, the condition of no veto-power implies the condition of weak no veto-power, which 
states that if an outcome x is ϕ-optimal at one profile R¯ and if the profile change from R¯ to 
R in a way that under the new profile an outcome y that was no better than x at R¯i for some 
agent i is weakly preferred to all outcomes in the weak lower contour set of R¯i at x according 
to the ordering Ri and this y is maximal for all other agents in the set X, then y should be a 
ϕ-optimal outcome at R. As a part of sufficiency, we require the following adaptation of the 
weak no veto-power condition to our Nash implementation problems.
Definition 7. A decomposable SCR ϕ : RI  X satisfies sector-wise weak no veto-power pro-
vided that for all s ∈ S, all xs ∈ Xs and all Rs, R¯s ∈ DsI if xs ∈ ϕs (Rs), ys ∈ L 
(
xs,Rsi
) ⊆
L 
(
ys, R¯si
)
for some i ∈ I and Xs ⊆ L 
(
ys, R¯sj
)
for all j ∈ I\ {i}, then ys ∈ ϕs (R¯s).
The main result of the section is also established with the aid of a domain restriction, 
which we now state below. Recall that Ls (x,Ri) = {(ys, xsC ) ∈ X|xRi (ys, xsC )} where xsC =(
x1, · · · , xs−1, xs+1, · · · , x). Then:
Property 1 (P1, for short): The domain RI satisfies P1 if for all R ∈ RI and all x ∈ X there 
exists a profile R¯ ∈RI ⋂RsepI (X) such that for every i ∈ I it holds that
8 Moore and Repullo (1990), Dutta and Sen (1991), Sjöström (1991) and Lombardi and Yoshihara (2013) refined 
Maskin’s Theorem by providing necessary and sufficient conditions for a SCR to be implementable in (pure strategies) 
Nash equilibrium. For an introduction to the theory of implementation see Jackson (2001) and Maskin and Sjöström
(2002).
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and that
L
(
x, R¯i
)⊆ L(x,Ri) . (4)
Basically, P1 says that for every outcome x ∈ X and every agent i, a non-separable preference 
ranking Ri can be part of the domain of orderings on X for agent i if it is coupled with a 
separable preference ranking R¯i such that (a) for every sector s, there is a monotonic change 
of marginal preferences around xs from Ri (xsC ) to R¯i (xsC ), and (b) the change of preferences 
from R¯i to Ri is a monotonic change around x. Therefore, for a given profile of non-separable 
orderings R, P1 requires that one should be able to find an observationally equivalent profile 
of separable orderings R¯ such that the standing of x improves when preferences change from 
R¯ to R. When P1 is violated, as shown in Example 1, there can be an agent who can secure a 
preferred outcome by obtaining in each sector an outcome ys that is worse than xs according the 
untrue environment announced by other agents. Note that P1 does not have any bite if each agent 
i’s domain of orderings consists only of separable preference rankings. Also, note that a separable 
ordering R¯i that satisfies (3) and (4) also satisfies the following property: Ls(x, Ri) = Ls(x, R¯i)
for each sector s ∈ S. Examples of domains satisfying P1 are provided in the next section.
The main result of this subsection can be stated as follows:
Theorem 5. Let n ≥ 3. Suppose that the domain RI satisfies P1. The SCR ϕ :RI X is Nash 
implementable in PE if ϕ satisfies decomposability, Maskin monotonicity, sector-wise Maskin 
monotonicity, decomposable Maskin monotonicity, sector-wise unanimity and sector-wise weak 
no veto-power.
Proof. See Appendix. 
Note that the above result basically coincides with Maskin (1999)’s result when there is only 
one sector. Before discussing the implications of Theorem 5 in the next section, let us first show 
that the domain condition represented by P1 is indeed an indispensable requirement for our 
characterization result.
Example 1. P1 is indispensable for Theorem 5. Let n = 3 and  = 2. Let I = {A,B,C} and let 
S = {1,2}. For sector s ∈ S, let Xs = {xs, ys} with xs = ys .
Suppose that agent A’s domain RA consists of the following strict orderings:
(y1, y2)PA(x
1, x2)PA(y
1, x2)PA(x
1, y2)
(x1, x2)P¯A(x
1, y2)P¯A(y
1, x2)P¯A(y
1, y2)
(y1, y2)P˜A(y
1, x2)P˜A(x
1, y2)P˜A(x
1, x2).
Among the listed orderings, one can check that the only ordering that is not a separable one 
is PA. The marginal orderings of PA are as follows:
for sector 1 : x1P 1A
(
x2
)
y1 and y1P 1A
(
y2
)
x1
for sector 2 : x2P 2A
(
x1
)
y2 and y2P 2A
(
y1
)
x2.
On the other hand, the marginal orderings of the separable orderings are as follows:
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for sector 2 : x2P¯ 2Ay2 and y2P˜ 2Ax2.
By definition of the sector-s domain, we have that P¯ sA and P˜
s
A are elements of DsA.
For the sake of simplicity, suppose that Ri for agent i = A consists only of one strict ordering 
Ri = {Pi}, which is as follows:
for agent B : (x1, x2)PB(y1, x2)PB(x1, y2)PB(y1, y2)
for agent C : (y1, y2)PC(y1, x2)PC(x1, y2)PC(x1, x2).
One can check that PB and PC are separable orderings on X, and that the marginal orderings of 
agents B and C are strict and are as follows:
for sector 1 : x1P 1By1 and y1P 1Cx1
for sector 2 : x2P 2By2 and y2P 2Cx2.
Suppose that the SCR ϕ :RI X satisfies all conditions of Theorem 5 but P1. Nonetheless, 
suppose that ϕ is Nash implementable in PE. Thus, there exists a product set of PE mechanisms 
 such that it Nash implements ϕ in PE.
The profile (PA,PB,PC) ≡ R is an element of RI . Suppose that 
(
x1, x2
) ∈ ϕ (R). Note that 
this combination would not be possible if RI satisfied P1.
Since the SCR ϕ is decomposable, there exists one-dimensional SCR ϕs on DsI for each s ∈ S. 
Given that ϕ is sector-wise Maskin monotonic and, moreover, it satisfies sector-wise unanimity 
as well as sector-wise weak no veto-power, let
ϕ1
(
P¯ 1A,P
1
B,P
1
C
)
=
{
x1
}
and ϕ2
(
P¯ 2A,P
2
B,P
2
C
)
=
{
x2
}
ϕ1
(
P˜ 1A,P
1
B,P
1
C
)
=
{
y1
}
and ϕ2
(
P˜ 2A,P
2
B,P
2
C
)
=
{
y2
}
.
Furthermore, since ϕ satisfies Maskin monotonicity and decomposable Maskin monotonicity, let 
ϕ (R) = {(x1, x2) , (y1, y2)}, ϕ (P¯A,PB,PC) = {(x1, x2)} and ϕ (P˜A,PB,PC) = {(y1, y2)}. 
Note that part (iii) of Definition 1 is satisfied as well.
Since 
(
x1, x2
) ∈ ϕ (R) and, moreover, since  Nash implements ϕ in PE, there exists m ∈ M
such that h (m) = {x}; that is, hs (ms) = {xs} for each s ∈ S. Since agent C needs not find 
any profitable unilateral deviation and PC on X is a separable strict ordering, it holds that 
hs
(
ms−C,MsC
) = {xs}. Moreover, since agent A also needs not find any profitable unilateral 
deviation from m, it must be the case that hs
(
ms−A,M
s
A
)= {xs} for at least one sector s ∈ S. Fix 
any of such a sector s. It follows that ms ∈ NE
(
s,
(
P˜ sA,P
s
B,P
s
C
))
given that hs (ms) = {xs}
is the top ranked outcome for agent B according to P sB . Since  Nash implements ϕ in PE, 
part (ii) of Definition 1 implies that xs ∈ ϕs
(
P˜ sA,P
s
B,P
s
C
)
, which contradicts the fact that 
ϕs
(
P˜ sA,P
s
B,P
s
C
)
= {ys}. Thus, P1 is indispensable for Theorem 5.
It is worth emphasizing here that P1 is not a necessary condition for implementation in PE, 
and so it does not provide a satisfactory answer to the question of what we loose when we 
adopt the practice dictated by PE mechanisms. A full answer to this question requires to provide 
a complete characterization of the domain of preferences on which non-trivial SCRs are Nash 
implementable in PE. This is an open research topic.
26 T. Hayashi, M. Lombardi / Journal of Economic Theory 169 (2017) 13–34A partial answer to the question is provided by Hayashi and Lombardi (2016), who provided 
a necessary domain condition which captures the insight provided by Example 1: No participant 
should be able to find a profitable deviation by obtaining a worse outcome in each sector. They 
have also showed the weak Pareto solution and the weak core solution cannot be Nash imple-
mented in PE, though these solutions can be Nash implemented when the CA can design a single 
mechanism for the whole economy.
4. Examples of Nash implementable SCRs in PE
In this section, we present some implications of Theorem 5. More precisely, we consider 
some interesting domains that are able to accommodate some forms of complementarity. Then, 
we show that the sector-wise (weak) core solution and the sector-wise Vickrey–Clarke–Groves 
solution are Nash implementable in PE.
The example below gives a straightforward domain that satisfies P1 in matching environ-
ments with no monetary transfers. For the sake of simplicity, suppose that there are only two 
sectors. Items of sector 1 can be viewed as school-seats and items of sector 2 as houses. With 
this in mind, suppose that houses x2 and y2 are equally sufficiently close to respective schools 
x1 and y1. Therefore, an interpretation of type of complementarity that the example below ac-
commodates is that agent i strictly prefers the bundles that minimize the distance school-home 
to other available assignments and she finds the assignments that minimize the distance school-
home, that is, 
(
x1, x2
)
and 
(
y1, y2
)
, as equally good. Assignments that do not minimize the 
distance are viewed as equally bad.
Example 2. Non-separability of preferences in environments with no monetary transfers. In this 
example we provide a preference domain that satisfies P1. To this end, suppose that S = {1, 2}
and that Xs = {xs, ys}, with xs = ys , for all s ∈ S. For any agent i ∈ I , define Ri as follows: 
Ri ∈Ri if either Ri ∈Rsep (X) or for all x1, y1 ∈ X1 and x2, y2 ∈ X2, it holds that
(x1, x2)I (Ri) (y
1, y2)P (Ri) (y
1, x2)Ri(x
1, y2). (5)
One can check that if Ri satisfies (5), then it is not a separable ordering given that the sector-1 
marginal ordering R1i
(
x2
)
differs from R1i
(
y2
)
. In order to check that 
∏
i∈I
Ri satisfies P1, let the 
following separable orderings be elements of Ri :
given (x1, x2) : (x1, x2)P (R¯i) (y1, x2)P (R¯i) (x1, y2)P (R¯i) (y1, y2)
given (y1, y2) : (y1, y2)P
(
R˜i
)
(x1, y2)P
(
R˜i
)
(y1, x2)P
(
R˜i
)
(x1, x2)
given (x1, y2) : (y1, x2)P
(
Rˆi
)
(y1, y2)I
(
Rˆi
)
(x1, x2)P
(
Rˆi
)
(x1, y2)
given (y1, x2) : (x1, y2)P (R′i) (x1, x2)I (R′i) (y1, y2)P (R′i) (y1, x2).
One can now easily check that 
∏
i∈I
Ri satisfies P1.
The next result also shows that in auction\public decisions environments with monetary trans-
fers, P1 accommodates non-separability of preferences due to income effects: If there is some 
change in the transfer payment of one sector, this affects how much one agent is willing to 
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tention has been paid so far to this source of non-separability of preferences. This is because 
much of the literature on auctions and, more generally, on social decision problems with income 
transfers, assumes that participants’ utilities are additively separable and linear in income, that 
is, participants have quasi-linear utilities, meaning that each participant’s utility is the value of a 
decision or item assignment plus-or-minus the value of any income transfer that she receives or 
makes.
For the sake of simplicity, let us suppose that there are only two important social issues on the 
table, denoted by s = 1, 2, such as two large public projects. Let Ds denote the set of potential 
pure social decisions for issue s. Let
T =
{
t ∈ [−t¯ ,∞)n :
∑
i∈I
ti ≤ 0
}
(6)
denote the set of closed transfers, where the real number t¯ > 0 denotes some predetermined 
upper-bound for payments. Let ei denote the initial endowment of commodity money of agent 
i ∈ I , which is assumed to be ei ≥ 2t¯ . A social decision for issue s is thus a pair (ds, t s), where 
the pure decision ds is an element of Ds and the vector of closed-transfer t s is an element of T . 
To economize on notation, let Xs ≡ Ds × T .
Suppose that agent i’s preferences Ri for outcomes in X1 ×X2 can be represented by a utility 
function ui (·;Ri) : X1 ×X2 →R+ of the form
ui
(
x1, x2;Ri
)
= Ui(d1, d2, t1i + t2i + ei;Ri), (7)
where Ui (·;Ri) : D1 ×D2 ×R+ →R+ is strictly increasing in money. This type of utility form 
encompasses a wide variety of agent’s preferences: separable ones and non-separable ones.
Proposition 1. Let S = {1,2}. For each s ∈ S, let Xs = Ds × T , where T is the set of closed 
transfers defined in (6). Assume that agent i’s preferences belonging to Ri are represented in the 
form given in (7). Suppose that her willingness to pay\accept is well defined.10 For each agent 
i ∈ I , suppose that Ri ∈ Ri satisfies the following property: For all d1, d¯1 ∈ D1, d2, d¯2 ∈ D2
and t1, t2 ∈ T , if
9 Recall that there are two sources of non-separability of preferences. One source is represented by the complementarity 
of items across sectors. In general, willingness to pay for a set of items may not be equal to the sum of willingness to 
pay for its components. The other source is represented by income effects. The first type of non-separability is typically 
studied in the literature of multiple-object auctions. It is now known that non-separability across related items creates 
efficiency issues and strategic interaction issues. For instance, as shown by Avery and Hendershott (2000), when items are 
complements, running first-price auction for each item separately yields higher expected revenue than auctioning a single 
bundle. The reason is that a bidder who has a stronger form of preference for complementarity bids more aggressively 
than other bidders in each auction in order to win all the relevant items, since winning just some of them is valueless 
for her. Although this is optimal from the seller’s viewpoint, it causes a problem of inefficiency, because it increases the 
probability that a bidder seeking complementarity wins only a part of the items which is valueless by itself alone, hence 
will resale it.
10 To assure that agent i’s willingness to pay/accept is well defined, we also assume that Ui satisfies the following 
property: For all d1, d¯1 ∈ D1, all d2, d¯2 ∈ D2, all t1, t2 ∈ T , there exist t¯1, ¯t2 ∈ T such that
Ui
(
d1, d2, t1i + t2i + ei ;Ri
)
= Ui
(
d¯1, d¯2, t¯1i + t¯2i + ei ;Ri
)
..
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1, d2, t1i + t2i + ei;Ri) = Ui(d¯1, d2, t1i +t1i + t2i + ei;Ri)
= Ui(d1, d¯2, t1i + t2i +t2i + ei;Ri),
(8)
then
Ui(d¯
1, d¯2, t1i +t1i + t2i +t2i + ei;Ri) = Ui(d1, d2, t1i + t2i + ei;Ri). (9)
Then, the domain 
∏
i∈I
Ri satisfies P1.
Proof. Let the premises hold. Take any 
(
x1, x2
) ∈ X1 ×X2 and any R ∈ ∏
i∈I
Ri . Since R ∈ ∏
i∈I
Ri
and, moreover, since each Ri of agent i has a utility representation of the form described in (7), 
L 
((
x1, x2
)
,Ri
)
is equivalent to L 
(
(d1, d2, t1i + t2i + ei),Ui
)
. Since for each agent i the income 
effect is fixed at one given level and, moreover, since Ri satisfies the above property, there exists a 
separable preference R′i ∈Ri for agent i such that the indifference surface of Ui passing through 
the bundle (d1, d2, t1i + t2i + ei) coincides exactly with the indifference surface of R′i through 
that bundle. 
Before showing that the sector-wise (weak) core solution and the sector-wise Vickrey–Clarke–
Groves solution are Nash implementable in PE, we need additional notation.
Definition 8. For each R ∈ RI and x ∈ X, a list of profiles of marginal orderings (R¯s)s∈S ∈∏
s∈S DsI is equivalent to R at x if
for all s ∈ S and all i ∈ I : L(xs, R¯si ) = L(xs,Rsi
(
xsC
)
).
Thus, (R¯s)s∈S is equivalent to the profile R at x if for any sector s and any agent i, the 
indifference surface of Rsi (xsC ) through the outcome xs coincides with the indifference surface 
of R¯si through the same outcome. In what follows, we assume that agent i’s domain of marginal 
preferences is rich in the following sense.
Definition 9. Dsi is rich if for each Ri ∈ Ri , x ∈ X and s ∈ S, there exists R¯si ∈ Dsi such that 
L 
(
xs, R¯si
)= L (xs,Rsi (xsC )).
4.1. Sector-wise (weak) core solution
A sector-s coalitional game is a four-tuple (I,Xs,Rs,υs), where:
• I is a finite set of agents, with n ≥ 3.
• Xs is a non-empty set of outcomes available from sector s.
• Rs is a profile of orderings for agents on Xs .
• υs is a sector-s characteristic function υs : 2N\ {∅} → 2Xs , which assigns for each nonempty 
coalition V a subset of outcomes.
Definition 10. For any sector-s coalitional game (I,Xs,Rs,υs), an outcome xs ∈ Xs is blocked 
by a coalition V if there is y ∈ υs (V ) such that (y, x) ∈ P (Rs) for each i ∈ V .i
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characteristic function υs , but he does not know agents’ preferences. This situation is modelled
by a four-tuple 
(
I,Xs,DsI , υs
)
, which we refer to as a sector-s coalitional game environment.
The sector-s core solution, denoted by ϕsCore, is a correspondence on DsI such that for each 
profile Rs ,
ϕsCore
(
Rs
)≡ {xs ∈ υs (I ) |xs is not blocked by any nonempty coalition V ⊆ I} .
Definition 11. The SCR ϕS-Core :RI X is the sector-wise core solution provided that for all 
R ∈RI and all x ∈ X:
x ∈ ϕS-Core (R) ⇐⇒ x ∈
∏
s∈S
ϕsCore
(
R¯s
)
for an arbitrary list of profiles (R¯s)s∈S ∈∏s∈S DsI that is equivalent to R at x.
In Example 2 we have provided an example of preference domain in environments with 
no income transfers that satisfies P1. In light of it, there are interesting domains consisting of 
non-separable preferences for which the sector-wise core solution is Nash implementable in PE. 
Formally:
Theorem 6. Take any preference domain RI satisfying P1. Suppose that agent i’s preference 
domain Dsi is rich for each sector s ∈ S. Suppose that there are at least two sectors,  ≥ 2. 
Let 
(
I,Xs,DsI , υs
)
be any coalitional game environment for sector s ∈ S. The sector-wise core 
solution ϕS-Core :RI X is Nash implementable in PE.
Proof. Let the premises hold. By construction, ϕS-Core satisfies decomposability. Moreover, it is 
well-known that sector-s core solution is unanimous and Maskin monotonic. Thus, ϕS-Core satis-
fies sector-wise Maskin monotonicity and sector-wise unanimity. We are left to show that ϕS-Core
satisfies Maskin monotonicity, decomposable Maskin monotonicity and sector-wise weak no 
veto-power. Let us first show that ϕS-Core satisfies sector-wise weak no veto-power. We do it 
below for an arbitrary s ∈ S.
Take any Rs, Rˆs ∈ DsI and suppose that xs ∈ ϕsCore (Rs), that ys ∈ L 
(
xs,Rsi
) ⊆ L (ys, Rˆsi )
for some i ∈ I , and that Xs ⊆ L 
(
ys, Rˆsj
)
for any other agent j ∈ I\ {i}. We show that ys ∈
ϕsCore
(
Rˆs
)
. Assume, to the contrary, that ys /∈ ϕsCore
(
Rˆs
)
.
Then, there exists a nonempty coalition V ⊆ I and an outcome zs ∈ vs (T ) such that 
zsP
(
Rˆsk
)
ys for all k ∈ V . Since the outcome ys is maximal for each agent j = i, it must 
be the case that V = {i}. Given that zsP
(
Rˆsi
)
ys , it follows that zs /∈ L 
(
ys, Rˆsi
)
, and so 
zs /∈ L (xs,Rsi ). Therefore, zsP (Rˆsi )xs , which contradicts the supposition that xs is a sector-s
core allocation for the coalitional game (I,Xs,Rs,υs). Thus, ϕsCore satisfies weak no veto-
power. We conclude that ϕS-Core satisfies sector-wise weak no veto-power.
To show that the sector-wise core solution ϕS-Core satisfies Maskin monotonicity, consider 
x ∈ ϕS-Core (R). Then, there exists a list of profiles of marginal orderings (Rs)s∈S ∈∏s∈S DsI
that is equivalent to R at x, that is, L 
(
xs,Rsi
)= L (xs,Rsi (xsC )) for each i ∈ I and each s ∈ S, 
with Rs ∈Ds .i i
30 T. Hayashi, M. Lombardi / Journal of Economic Theory 169 (2017) 13–34Furthermore, consider any profile R¯ ∈ RI such that for all i ∈ I , it holds that L(x, Ri) ⊆
L(x, R¯i). Then, for any i ∈ I and any s ∈ S, it also holds that
for all i ∈ I , all s ∈ S and all ys ∈ Xs : (xs, xsC )Ri(ys, xsC ) =⇒ (xs, xsC )R¯i(ys, xsC ).
Since agent i’s preference domain Dsi is rich for each sector s ∈ S, it follows that there ex-
ists a list of profiles of marginal orderings (R¯s)s∈S ∈∏s∈S DsI that is equivalent to R¯ at x, that 
is, L 
(
xs, R¯si
) = L (xs, R¯si (xsC )) for each i ∈ I and each s ∈ S, with R¯si ∈ Dsi . Moreover, by 
definition of ϕS-Core , it follows that xs ∈ ϕsCore(Rs) for all s ∈ S. Then, for any given s ∈ S, 
we established that xs ∈ ϕsCore(Rs) and L(xs, Rsi ) ⊆ L(xs, R¯si ) for all i ∈ I . Given that ϕsCore
is a sector-wise Maskin monotonic SCR, we have that xs ∈ ϕsCore
(
R¯s
)
for all s ∈ S, and so 
x ∈ ϕS-Core
(
R¯
)
. Thus, the sector-wise core solution is Maskin monotonic. Moreover, the above 
arguments also show that the sector-wise core solution satisfies decomposable Maskin mono-
tonicity.
Theorem 5 implies that ϕS-Core is Nash implementable in PE. 
4.2. Sector-wise VCG solution
Let us consider the auction\public decision environment with income transfers described 
above. It is well-known that the Vickrey auction is a special case of the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves 
(VCG) mechanism, which we now proceed to define below.11 Before proceeding, let us note 
that complementarities as well as income effects are ruled out once participants’ preferences are 
assumed to be separable and to have a utility representation of the form indicated in (7)—on 
this point, see Vives (1987) and Hayashi (2013).12 This means that each element Rsi ∈Dsi has a 
quasi-linear utility representation
usi
(
xs,Rsi
)= vs (ds,Rsi )+ (t si + ei) ,
where vs
(
ds,Rsi
)
denotes the benefit that agent i of type Rsi receives from a decision ds ∈ Ds , 
and t si a payment to agents.
A sector-s VCG game environment is a five-tuple 
(
I,Xs,DsI , ds, τ s
)
, where:
• I is a finite set of agents, with n ≥ 3.
• Xs ≡ Ds × T is a non-empty set of outcomes available from sector-s, where Ds denotes the 
set of pure decisions and T is the set of closed transfers defined in (6).
• DsI is the domain of agents’ quasi-linear preferences for outcomes in Xs .• ds :DsI → Ds is a decision rule that prescribes the pure decision that is efficient contingent 
on preferences Rˆs reported by agents, that is,
ds
(
Rˆs
)
∈ arg max
d¯s∈Ds
⎛
⎝∑
j∈I
vsj
(
d¯s ,Rsj
)⎞⎠
.
11 The Clarke–Groves mechanism is introduced in Clarke (1971) and Groves (1973).
12 Vives (1987) considers an increasing sequence of sets of commodities, and under certain assumptions shows that 
income effect on each single commodity vanishes as the number of commodity and income tend to infinity at the same 
rate. Hayashi (2013) considers a continuum of commodity characteristics and shows that when a commodity—described 
as a subset of the set of commodity characteristics—tends to be arbitrarily small the preference induced over pairs of 
consumption of the commodity under analysis and income transfer to be allocated to the other commodities converges to 
a quasi-linear one.
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(
Rˆs
)
> 0 (and from 
agents if τ si
(
Rˆs
)
< 0) contingent on preferences Rˆs reported by agents, as follows:
τ si
(
Rˆs
)
= hi
(
Rˆs−i
)
−
∑
j∈I\{i}
vsj
(
ds
(
Rˆs
)
,Rsj
)
, (10)
where hi (·) is an arbitrary function that is independent of agent i’s report.
The outcome (ds, ts) ∈ Xs is a sector-s VCG outcome of the VCG game (I,Xs,Rs, ds, τ s) if 
ds = d (Rs) and t s = τ s (Rs). The sector-s VCG solution, denoted by ϕsVCG, is a correspondence 
on DsI such that for each profile Rs ,
ϕsVCG
(
Rs
)≡ {xs ∈ Xs |xs = (ds (Rs) , τ s (Rs))} .
Definition 12. The SCR ϕS-VCG :RI X is the sector-wise VCG solution if for each R ∈RI ,
x ∈ ϕS-VCG(R) ⇐⇒ x ∈
∏
s∈S
ϕsVCG(R¯
s)
for an arbitrary list of profiles (R¯s)s∈S ∈∏s∈S DsI that is equivalent to R at x.
The main result of this subsection can then be stated as follows.
Theorem 7. Take any preference domain RI satisfying P1. Suppose that agent i’s preference 
domain Dsi is rich for each sector s ∈ S. Suppose that there are at least two sectors,  ≥ 2. 
Let 
(
I,Xs,DsI , ds, τ s
)
be any VCG game environment for sector s ∈ S. The sector-wise VCG 
solution ϕS-VCG :RI X is Nash implementable in PE.
Proof. Let the premises hold. By construction, ϕS-VCG satisfies decomposability. Moreover, it 
is well-known that sector-s VCG solution is Maskin monotonic and a unanimous SCR. More-
over, sector-s VCG solution satisfies weak no veto-power vacuously. Thus, the sector-wise VCG 
solution ϕS-VCG satisfies sector-wise Maskin monotonicity, sector-wise weak no veto-power and 
sector-wise unanimity. Reasoning like that used in the proof of Theorem 6 shows that ϕS-VCG
satisfies Maskin monotonicity, as well as decomposable Maskin monotonicity. Then, Theorem 5
implies that ϕS-VCG is Nash implementable in PE. 
5. Concluding remarks
A product set of PE mechanisms is a mechanism in which its participants are constrained 
to submit their rankings to sector authorities separately and, moreover, sector authorities cannot 
communicate with each other, due to misspecification by the CA that preferences are separable 
or due to technical/institutional constraints. Therefore, a key property of a single PE mechanism 
is that participants are required to behave as if they had separable preferences.
We identify a set of necessary conditions for the implementation of SCRs via a product set 
of PE mechanisms, that is, for the implementation in PE. Furthermore, under mild auxiliary 
conditions, reminiscent of Maskin’s Theorem (1999), we have also shown that they are sufficient 
for the implementation in PE.
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quantify how much we lose by the type of misspecification considered in this paper. Theoretical, 
empirical and experimental studies will be helpful there.
It is also worth investigating what can be implemented when an incomplete yet not negligible 
communication is allowed among SAs, while the central designer has to make some modelling
choice about how SAs communicate.
Another direction will be to study how we can improve the mechanism in a sector while 
keeping fixed the mechanisms in other sectors and, given such change, how we can improve the 
mechanism in another sector while keeping fixed those in other sectors, and so on. There is no 
obvious way to do it because under general equilibrium effects it is not obvious whether or not a 
change regarded as an “improvement” from the point of view of PE mechanism design is indeed 
an improvement. That research direction will answer the question of how we should change the 
PE mechanism in an improving manner.
6. Appendix
6.1. Proof of Theorem 5
Let the premises hold. The proof is based on the construction of a product set of PE mecha-
nisms  = (s)s∈S , where sector-s PE mechanism, s = (Ms,hs), is a canonical mechanism.
Sector s ∈ S PE mechanism:
Agent i’s message space is defined by13
Msi =DsI ×Xs ×Z+,
where Z+ is the set of nonnegative integers. Thus, agent i’s strategy consists of an outcome 
in Xs , a profile of orderings and a nonnegative integer. Thus, a typical strategy played by agent i
is denoted by msi =
(
(Rs)i , (xs)i , zi
)
. The message space of agents is the product space
Ms =
∏
i∈I
Msi ,
with ms as a typical strategy profile. The outcome function hs is defined with the following three 
rules:
Rule 1: If msi =
(
(Rs)i , (xs)i ,0
)
= (R¯s, xs,0) for each agent i ∈ I and xs ∈ ϕs (R¯s), then 
hs (ms) = xs .
Rule 2: If n − 1 agents play msj =
(
R¯s, xs,0
)
with xs = ϕs (R¯s), but agent i plays msi =(
(Rs)i , (xs)i , zi
)
= (R¯s, xs,0), then we can have two cases:
1. If xsR¯si (x
s)i , then hs (ms) = (xs)i .
2. If (xs)i P
(
R¯si
)
xs , then hs (ms) = xs .
13 Note that Ds is nonempty for each agent i ∈ I since P1 holds.
i
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there is a tie at the top, pick the agent with lowest index among them.) This agent is declared the 
winner of the game and the alternative implemented is the one she selects.
Since ϕ is decomposable, there exists a sequence (ϕs)s∈S of one-dimensional SCRs, where 
ϕs : DsI  Xs for each s ∈ S. Also, note that the proof of part (ii) of Definition 1 follows very 
closely the proof of Repullo (1987, pp. 40–41) given that ϕs satisfies sector-wise Maskin mono-
tonicity, sector-wise weak no veto-power and sector-wise unanimity. To complete the proof, we 
show that part (i) and part (iii) of Definition 1 are satisfied as well. Thus, let us fix any R ∈RI .
Nothing has to be proved if R is a profile of separable orderings. The reason is that 
NE (,R) =∏s∈S NE (s,Rs) and that part (ii) and part (iii) of Definition 1 hold. Therefore, 
let us suppose that R is not a profile of separable orderings.
Let us first show that h (NE(,R)) ⊆ ϕ (R). Take any x ∈ h (NE(,R)). Then, there exists 
m ∈ NE(, R) such that h (m) = (hs (ms))s∈S = x. Then, given that m ∈ NE(, R), for each 
agent i ∈ I it holds that
for each s ∈ S : hs (ms)Rsi
((
hsˆ
(
msˆ
))
sˆ∈S\{s}
)
hs
(
mˆsi ,m
s−i
)
for each mˆsi ∈ Msi . (11)
Given that RI satisfies P1, there exists a profile R¯ ∈RI ⋂RsepI (X) such that for all i ∈ I , it 
holds that
for all s ∈ S : Ls (h (m) ,Ri) ⊆ Ls
(
h(m) , R¯i
) (12)
and that
L
(
h(m) , R¯i
)⊆ L(h (m) ,Ri) . (13)
Then, from (11) and (12) and from the fact that R¯ ∈ RI ⋂RsepI (X), it follows that for all 
i ∈ I and all s ∈ S it holds that
hs
(
ms
)
R¯si h
s
(
m˜si ,m
s−i
)
for all m˜si ∈ Msi ,
and so
for all s ∈ S : ms ∈ NE (s, R¯s) .
Part (ii) of Definition 1 and decomposability imply that h (m) ∈ ϕ (R¯). Since the SCR ϕ is 
Maskin monotonic and since, moreover, (13) holds for every agent, it follows that h (m) ∈ ϕ (R). 
This completes the proof that h (NE(,R)) ⊆ ϕ (R). Note that the preceding arguments also 
show that part (iii) of Definition 1 is met as well.
For the converse, suppose that x ∈ ϕ (R). Given that the RI satisfies P1, it follows that there 
exists a profile R¯ ∈RI ⋂RsepI (X) such that for all i ∈ I , it holds that
for all s ∈ S : Ls (x,Ri) ⊆ Ls
(
x, R¯i
) (14)
and that
L
(
x, R¯i
)⊆ L(x,Ri) . (15)
Since x ∈ ϕ (R) and since, moreover, (14) holds for each agent i and each sector s, 
decomposable Maskin monotonicity implies that x ∈ ϕ (R¯). Furthermore, given that R¯ ∈
RI
⋂Rsep (X), decomposability implies ϕ (R¯) =∏ ϕs(R¯s), where R¯s ∈ Ds is the profile I s∈S I
34 T. Hayashi, M. Lombardi / Journal of Economic Theory 169 (2017) 13–34of sector-s marginal orderings induced by R¯. Part (ii) of Definition 1 implies that ϕ (R¯) =∏
s∈S hs
(
NE
(
s, R¯s
))
. Moreover, given that NE
(
, R¯
) = ∏s∈S hs (NE (s, R¯s)), we have 
that ϕ
(
R¯
)= h (NE (, R¯)). Thus, there exists m ∈ M such that h (m) = x and that
for all i ∈ I : {h (m′i ,m−i) ∈ X|m′i ∈ Mi}⊆ L (x, R¯i) .
Finally, given that (15) holds, it follows that
for all i ∈ I : {h (m′i ,m−i) ∈ X|m′i ∈ Mi}⊆ L(x,Ri) .
We have that h (m) = x ∈ h (NE (,R)). Thus, we have established part (i) of Definition 1. 
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